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Projecting a credible land combat power to a potential conflict area in a timely 
manner requires rapid strategic sealift mobility with high capacity. A highly deployable, 
light, yet sufficiently lethal force capable of deterrence or sustaining combat is necessary 
to accomplish this objective. 
The Army’s initial steps towards transformation seek to establish that ability. This 
transformation requires having lighter forces with quicker deployment times, thereby 
turning the Army from the Legacy Force, made up of both well-equipped heavy war 
fighting forces which are difficult to deploy strategically, and rapidly responding light 
forces which lack staying power against heavy mechanized forces, into an Interim Force 
of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT).  The SBCT combines the capacity for rapid 
deployment with survivability and tactical mobility. The Army’s objective is to deploy 
the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, a brigade-sized force equipped with medium weight 
armored vehicles, anywhere in the world within 96 hours (Vick, 2002). 
This thesis determines the mix of sealift assets best suited for different scenarios 
that differ by distance and port accessibility as well as analyzes the implications of these 
findings on Army deployment doctrine. This is accomplished in two ways. First, two 
specific scenarios are used to develop the initial requirements and best mix of assets for 
SBCT deployment based on a fictional Kosovo campaign.  Additionally, a preliminary 
analysis is conducted of the three feasible configuration options. The options are (1) 
TSVs only, (2) LMSRs only or (3) a combination of the two. These three options are 
compared using fixed cargo requirements and their performance versus cost is analyzed 
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Projecting a credible land combat power to a potential conflict area in a timely 
manner requires rapid strategic sealift mobility with high capacity. A highly deployable, 
light, yet sufficiently lethal force capable of deterrence or sustaining combat is necessary 
to accomplish this objective. 
The Army’s initial steps towards transformation seek to establish that ability. This 
transformation requires having lighter forces with quicker deployment times, thereby 
turning the Army from the Legacy Force, made up of both well-equipped heavy war 
fighting forces which are difficult to deploy strategically, and rapidly responding light 
forces which lack staying power against heavy mechanized forces, into an Interim Force 
of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT).  The SBCT combines the capacity for rapid 
deployment with survivability and tactical mobility. The Army’s objective is to deploy 
the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, a brigade-sized force equipped with medium weight 
armored vehicles, anywhere in the world within 96 hours (Vick, 2002). 
This thesis determines the mix of sealift assets best suited for different scenarios 
that differ by distance and port accessibility as well as analyzes the implications of these 
findings on Army deployment doctrine.  This is accomplished in two ways. First, two 
specific scenarios are used to develop the initial requirements and best mix of assets for 
SBCT deployment based on a fictional Kosovo campaign.  Additionally, a preliminary 
analysis is conducted of the three feasible configuration options. The options are (1) 
TSVs only, (2) LMSRs only or (3) a combination of the two. These three options are 
compared using fixed cargo requirements and their performance versus cost is analyzed 
based on the Kosovo campaign distances. 
From the analysis conducted in this paper it would appear that the 96-hour time 
requirement to deploy a SBCT using sealift assets would only be viable within short pre-
positioned (PREPO) intra-theater ranges vice a global response, meaning that the SBCT 
cannot meet the 96-hour global deployment time frame from CONUS. This highlights the 
advantage and need of PREPO units for rapid response. 
 xvii
Specifically, this analysis finds that the best mix of assets depends on the scenario 
distance and port accessibility. Two scenarios are modeled based on a fictional Kosovo 
campaign.  The first scenario deploys the SBCT from the PREPO location of Camp 
Darby, Italy. The second scenario deploys the SBCT from the CONUS location of 
Beaumont, Texas. Next, a hybrid of this CONUS scenario is conducted by changing the 
destination port characteristics to test the sensitivity of the model solution.  
These results show that for PREPO ranges up to 1250 nautical miles the TSV is 
better suited for SBCT deployment with its greater speed and shallower draft regardless 
of port conditions. For greater ranges, the LMSR is the preferred platform because of its 
endurance and capacity. Introducing port degradation at increased ranges may change the 
optimal solution depending if the time delays associated with the LMSRs is greater than 
the time for the additional refueling required by the TSVs. 
Cost versus performance analysis shows that for short ranges better performance 
can be achieved at higher costs using TSVs. As the range increases, the use of LMSRs 
becomes the preferred option for performance at moderate cost.  If time is not important 
then the less expensive combination of mixing one of each asset becomes an attractive 
option at longer ranges.  
The Army’s transformation objective of a 96-hour global deployment time 
implies a rapid strategic sealift at speeds that are currently not possible from CONUS.  
With increased efficiency in loading/unloading and refueling times as well as other 
mobility enhancements it will be possible to further reduce SBCT deployment times 




I. INTRODUCTION  
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Traditionally, to deter and defeat major threats in select regions with joint forces, 
the United States has relied on forward-deployed Army and U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
forces, Navy and United States Marine Corps (USMC) forces afloat, long-range aircraft 
in the continental United States (CONUS), pre-positioned elements in key regions, and 
reinforcing units from CONUS.  For emergent crises with short-warning in other regions, 
Marine Expeditionary Units, the 82nd Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces, and 
USAF/Navy air would be combined as appropriate to provide a limited capability that is 
usually sufficient for noncombatant evacuations and other lesser contingencies.  (Vick, 
2002) As a result of the challenging logistics involved in transportation, a major problem 
facing the United States is its inability to project land power into a crisis area or within a 
theater of operations at the speed and tempo required.  
The Army’s initial steps towards transformation seek to establish that ability 
which equates to having lighter forces with quicker deployment times thereby, turning 
the Army from the Legacy Force made up of well-equipped heavy war fighting forces, 
which are difficult to deploy strategically, and rapidly responding light forces, which lack 
staying power against heavy mechanized forces, into an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade 
Combat Teams (SBCT).  The SBCT combines the capacity for rapid deployment with 
survivability and tactical mobility. The Army’s objective is to deploy the Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team, a brigade-sized force equipped with medium weight armored vehicles, 
anywhere in the world within 96 hours (Vick, 2002). 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Historically, large U.S. Joint Operations comprised of at least one ground force 
brigade equivalent and one air wing equivalent have been concentrated in just a few 
regions: Europe, Latin America, the Persian Gulf and Asia.  Currently the Defense 
Transportation system cannot support the Army’s strategic mobility requirement to move 
a medium brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five 
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divisions in 30 days. (Hickins, 2002)   Despite the use of aircraft to transport troops and 
equipment to distant theaters, sealift will remain vital since 95 percent of dry cargo and 
99 percent of liquid cargo will most likely move by sea (Ronis, 2003). Thus, having high 
speed sealift capability promises even greater payload throughput. 
For the Army the primary advantage of using strategic sealift as a means of force 
projection is its ability to transport all of the Army’s equipment.  The ability to transport 
complete packages of combat units intact via high speed sealift ships such as the Theater 
Support Vessel (TSV) and the large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) would 
enable the Army to sustain operational momentum.  High-speed sealift is a powerful tool 
in bridging the gap to allow U.S. forces to close fast enough but heavy enough to 
accomplish the mission.  
  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As described above, the Army needs to be able to provide rapid, yet sustainable, 
forces for joint operations within short notice. Therefore, trade-off analysis must be 
conducted between the strategic sealift assets (TSVs and LMSRs) and their ability to 
fulfill the requirements for payload, cost and speed. Using response time as a metric, an 
individual TSV provides a clear speed advantage, but at a significant cost premium with 
less range and capacity. Larger vessels have greater range and transport capacity and can 
meet the cargo requirements, if given enough time. The objective is to determine the best 
mix of sealift assets to ensure the Stryker Brigade deployments are met in the minimal 
amount of time for different scenarios, while also establishing the likelihood of meeting 
the 96-hour deployment requirement.  This is accomplished in two ways. First, two 
specific scenarios are used to develop the initial requirements and best mix of assets for 
SBCT deployment based on a fictional Kosovo campaign.  Additionally, a preliminary 
analysis is conducted of the three feasible configuration options. The options are (1) 
TSVs only, (2) LMSRs only or (3) a combination of the two. These three options are 
compared using fixed cargo requirements and their performance versus cost is analyzed 




1. Preliminary Analysis 
Prior to beginning an in-depth, quantitative analysis, it was apparent that a 
preliminary evaluation of solutions to this problem could be helpful. To meet the basic 
requirement of cargo space for the Army SBCT, three options mentioned earlier are 
proposed.  Each of these options is feasible, in terms of delivering the minimum required 
cargo. But when considering the cost and deployment time of each option, the differences 
among the options become significant.  Additionally, when the minimum cargo 
requirement is adjusted, the best option changes. This analysis is conducted in Chapter 
IV. 
 
2. Detailed Analysis 
Through the use of an integer linear program (ILP) model developed in Microsoft 
Office Excel this thesis determines the mix of sealift assets best suited for different 
scenarios that differ by distance and port accessibility as well as analyzes the implications 
of these findings on Army deployment doctrine. The Army’s SBCT transformation 
concept is focused around the goal of a 96-hour deployment time frame.  There are 
several military planning factors that affect the time required to deploy units that are 
considered in this research: 
• Composition of deploying units (size and weight) 
• Proximity and suitability of seaport infrastructure  (distance, draft and 
capacity) 
• Mobility assets allocated to deployment (quantity and type of assets 
available) 
Using the above military planning factors this research develops a spreadsheet to 
analyze the different scenarios incorporating sealift options to aid in global mobility.  The 
objective is to compare TSV and LMSR performance against varying ranges and port 
characteristics to determine a feasible mix that meets or exceeds the 96-hour time 
requirement. 
The military planning factors described above serve as inputs to the integer linear 
program model, and their actual model input value is determined from the author’s 
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experience, historic operations and discussions with experts.  The aim of the model is to 
evaluate and propose a recommended number of sealift assets required for different 
scenarios based on minimizing response time. 
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II. SEALIFT CONSIDERATION 
A. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS  
The Army’s transformation efforts toward lighter forces with quicker deployment 
times has manifested in the form of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team and Theater Support 
Vessels (TSVs) to assist the current inventory of ships to transport them. This is due in 
part to some of the strategic mobility deficiencies noted by the Department of Defense. 
 
1. Department of Defense (DoD) Requirements 
Sealift is the foundation of the DoD’s strategic mobility structure. As a result of 
the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and the 1995 Mobility Requirements 
Study/Bottom-up Review Update (MRS BURU), the Department of Defense is 
attempting a sealift expansion to increase its ability to quickly move military equipment 
in the event of a contingency or war.  The studies highlighted a strategic sealift shortfall 
and recommended the acquisition of ships to meet the requirements.   
The DoD was not fully prepared to meet the logistics sealift challenge posed by a 
full mobilization during the Gulf War in 1991 (Hickins, 2002). Since then, military 
planners have identified the required forces that need lift during a contingency.  To 
provide a sense of the Army’s mobility requirement, Table 1 below shows the average 
number of shiploads using LMSRs based on data from the Army’s 1994 Tables of 
Organization and Equipment (Congressional Budget Office, 1997).  The estimated 
weights include accompanying supplies, equipment, and ammunition; and the number of 











Approximate Lift Requirements for Army Contingency Forces 
 Number of Unit Weight Airlift Sorties Number 
Notional Army Unit Personnel (Tons) (C-141/C-17 mix) of LMSRs
Airborne Division 13,242 26,699 1,101/78 2.8 
Air Assault Division 15,840 35,860 1,412/195 3.9 
Armored Division 17,756 110,431 1,761/1,274 6.2 
Mechanized Division 17,982 109,116 1,708/1,275 6.2 
Light Infantry Division 11,036 17,092 769/41 1.8 
Corps-Support Command 22,410 98,717 3,599/500 8.5 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of Defense, Military Traffic Management Command, Deployment Planning Guide, 
94-700-5    (Newport News, Va., September 1994).  
 
Table 1.   Approximate Lift Requirements for Army Contingency Forces. 
 
 
2. TSV Operational Requirements  
To contribute to power projection capability, an emerging transportation option 
known as the Theater Support Vessel (TSV) is a reliable strategic high-speed sealift ship. 
In accordance with statutory (Title 10 USC), Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) 
and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Combined Arms Support Command 
(CASCOM) outlined the following mandatory requirements in an industry brief dated 
March 2003 that are explained below: 
1.  Intra-theater lift 5.  Passengers 
2.  Roll On / Roll Off (RO/RO) 6.  Self-Deployment 
3.  Cargo Deck & Ramp 7.  Interoperability 
4.  Load/Unload non-RO/RO 8.  Shallow Draft 
 
a. Intra-Theater Lift Requirements 
The TSV will provide the Army an internally controlled intra-theater 
sealift capability for movement and maneuver of combat ready unit sets within the Joint 
Operational Area (JOA) from Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB) and Ports of 
Embarkation (POE).  The threshold data in Table 2 indicates the existing capabilities of 
the TSV in a fully loaded condition in a sea state-3 with soldiers and passengers. The  
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objective data represents the projected capabilities utilizing military and commercial 
technologies to improve the TSV’s productivity, survivability and supportability. (Crum, 
2003) 
 
 Threshold Objective 
 Speed: 36 Knots 50 Knots 
 Range: 1250 NM 2500 NM 
 Payload: 754 ST 1250 ST 
 
Table 2.   TSV Performance Goals. 
 
 
b. RO/RO Operations Requirements 
The TSV must be Roll-on-roll-off (RO/RO).  RO/RO is a method of 
transport by which vehicles or cargoes are rolled on a platform (such as a ship) at the 
embarkation point and then rolled off at the destination. Approximately 62% to 75% of 
the Army’s maneuver element cargoes are roll-on-roll-off. Loading & discharging is 
400% faster than using shore side cranes as this type of cargo has the ability to move on 
and off an ocean vessel under its own power (Crum, 2003). Additionally, the TSV will 
likely have to operate in minor or degraded ports where shore side cranes are not 
available. Therefore, RO/RO capability is essential for the TSV to accomplish many of 
its intended missions. 
 
c. Cargo Deck/Ramp Weight Requirements 
The TSV will be optimized to support operational movement and 
maneuver of the SBCT while continuing to provide support to current heavy forces. 
Assets such as the M1A2 (Main Battle Tank) will remain in the Army’s inventory for the 
foreseeable future.  Therefore the weight of such assets must be taken into consideration. 
Without M1A2 cargo loading/transport capability the TSV can only support 30-40% of 
active Army division level maneuver element (Crum, 2003). 
 
d. Non-RO/RO Cargo Requirements 
The TSV mission profile is to insert forces and follow-on sustainment 
through minor or degraded ports where shore side cranes and other material handling 
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equipment may not be available. Therefore, the TSV must be able to receive and 
discharge non-RO/RO containers and pallets to the support the Army’s remaining non-
RO/RO requirements. (Crum, 2003) 
 
e. Passenger Requirements 
The TSV is designed to transport 354 combat ready soldiers. Without 
passenger capability the TSV cannot accomplish intended mission of operational 
movement of ready to fight elements. (Crum, 2003) 
 
f. Self Deployment Requirements 
The Army’s TSV will possess the capability to strategically self-deploy 
and mass within an area of responsibility (AOR) to provide the commander with a potent 
theater distribution asset (Crum, 2003). 
 
g. Interoperability Requirements 
The focus of interoperability, in this case the ability to operate with other 
units, is in communications. The TSV must possess the capability to communicate secure 
/unsecured data and voice with higher, lower and adjacent units in a joint environment. 
(Crum, 2003) 
 
h. Shallow Draft Requirements 
To increase worldwide accessibility the maximum draft is defined at 18 
feet with an optimal objective of 15 feet. These figures align with the results from other 
top-level port studies of some 282 ports in US Central Command and US Pacific 








B. TSV CAPABILITIES 
 
1. Technical Specifications 
The technical specifications of the TSV addressed in this report are obtained 
mainly from the Advanced Mobility Concepts Study (AMCS) data from the Center for 
Army Analysis (CAA) (Burger, 2003). These adopted specifications shown in Figure 1 
are used to serve as baseline identifications of a TSV in terms of physical characteristics 
and capabilities, especially in the areas of speed and payload. 
 
Length 393 feet   
Beam 104 feet    
Measurement 754 tons  
Cargo capacity 25,000 sq. ft.  
Speed: 40 knots    
Endurance 1250 nautical miles at 40 
knots 
Troops: 354 combat ready soldiers. 
 
Figure 1.   TSV Characteristics. (From CAA) 
 
2. Operational Assumptions 
The refueling of the TSV will be conducted at 1,250 nm intervals at sea. The 
refueling time at sea is calculated to be 4-5 hours per refueling based on CAA 
deployability analysis which includes times for approach, set-up, refuel, disengage and 
pull off. (Burger, 2003) 
 
C. LMSR CAPABILITIES 
 
The characteristics below in Figure 2 are taken from published data of a 
representative class ship (T-AKR 295 Shughart) and outline the capabilities of the Large, 
Medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR).  The adopted specifications are used to serve as 
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baseline identifications of a LMSR in terms of physical characteristics and capabilities, 
especially in the areas of speed and payload.  
 
Length 956 (289.4 meters)   
Beam 105.9 feet (32.2 meters)   
Measurement 55,422 tons (56,303.21 
long tons)   
Cargo capacity 284,064 sq. ft. plus 
49,991 sq. ft. deck cargo   
Speed: 24 knots (27.6 mph)   
Endurance 12,200 nautical miles at 
24 knots 
Crew: 26 civilian crew (up to 45); up 
to 50 active duty   
 
Figure 2.   LMSR Characteristics. (From CAA) 
 
A single LMSR is capable of supporting combat missions by carrying an entire 
U.S. Army Task Force, including 58 tanks, 48 other track vehicles, plus more than 900 
trucks and other wheeled vehicles.  In addition, LMSRs have a slewing stern ramp and a 
removable ramp, which services two side ports making it easy to drive vehicles on and 
off the ship.  Two 110-ton single pedestal twin cranes make it possible to load and unload 
cargo where shore-side infrastructure is limited or nonexistent. (www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/takr-295.htm) 
These sealift ships are capable of self-sustained RO/RO and Lift on/Lift off 
(LO/LO) operations at a pier and in a Logistics-Over-the Shore (LOTS) scenario through 
stern and side port ramps to a RO/RO Discharge Facility (RRDF). In addition, the LMSR 
is capable of self-sustained LO/LO cargo operations in a LOTS scenario by interfacing 
with lighterage or barges alongside to load and unload. The LMSR ships are not armed 
and do not have a combat system. However, they do have C3I suite sufficient to perform 




D. STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (SBCT) 
We must provide early entry forces that can operate jointly, without access 
to fixed forward bases, but we still need the power to slug it out and win 
decisively. Today, our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack 
staying power. We will address those mismatches. -- GEN Eric Shinseki, 
CSA, 23 June 1999  
The Stryker Concept reflects the vision of the previous Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Shinseki, who argued that the existing force was either too heavy to be 
deployed quickly (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) or too light to be effective 
(airborne or light infantry).  To attempt to solve the deployment problem, the forces 
underwent restructuring making them more agile, and cues were taken from the Air Force 
and the Navy about lift to create the concept of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
(SBCT).  The SBCT is configured to arrive early in a crisis, but is not intended to serve 
as an assault force. Normally, it would be deployed to an area already under friendly 
control. 
Experiences and lessons learned from the stationing of the first two SBCTs (3/2 
IN and 1/25 IN) at Fort Lewis, Washington are still under review according to the Army 
Modernization Plan 2003.  The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is an infantry-
centric unit with 3,600 soldiers that combines many of the best characteristics of the 
current Army forces and exploits technology to fill a current operations capability gap 
between the Army’s heavy and light forces.  (www.lewis.army.mil/transformation)  
The SBCT capabilities differ significantly from those found in traditional 
divisional brigades, primarily due to an array of units organic to the SBCT.  In addition to 
its three infantry battalions, the SBCT has a cavalry squadron for reconnaissance, 
surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA), a brigade support battalion, a field artillery 
battalion, a military intelligence company, an engineer company, a signal company, an 
anti-tank company, and a headquarters company. More details on the variants and 




The fielding of six Stryker Brigades supports the execution of the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), and enables the Army to deploy worldwide to combat future 
threats where U.S. access is limited essentially to provide the right force to the right place 
at the right time (www.lewis.army.mil/transformation). The SBCT composition size and 
weight which will be used for the basis of modeling is obtained from data provided by 
CAA and is listed as 14,406 short tons, 261,989 sq. ft with 3,848 passengers. (Burger, 
2003) 
 
E. SEALIFT PLANNING FACTORS AND CALCULATIONS 
Sealifting the SBCT presents a variety of issues that must be considered.  Sealift 
planning factors include sail time, loading and unloading times, and refueling time.  
Sealift deployment time is calculated from the moment the ship begins to load at the port 
of embarkation to when the ship is completely unloaded at the port of debarkation.  
The sealift analysis is based on the assumptions that in the 96-hour timeframe the 
deploying units prepare to deploy, move to the port, and begin to load as soon as the 
ships are available. 
The difficulty is in finding good ports in the regions of the world where the SBCT 
is most likely to be deployed.  The TSVs do not have the range and payload to be ideal 
for longer-range deployments, but they are better suited for regional deployments where 
shallow or undeveloped port conditions may exist. The poorer the port condition, the less 
attractive the use of deep draft long range sealift assets such as the LMSR. 
The times in Figure 3 below are based upon 20 knots sailing speed (LMSR) and 
40 knots sailing speed (TSV). The distance is reported in nautical miles with the 
corresponding times for transit based on speed for an LMSR and a TSV.  From the graph 
it would take LMSRs five to six days to reach ports in the vicinity of most Asian littoral 
hot spots from the forward positions of Diego Garcia and Guam.  Utilizing TSVs would 
reduce the time approximately in half, as longer ranges requiring refueling would 
lengthen the times shown somewhat. (Peltz, 2003) 
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Figure 3 also highlights the advantage of having pre-positioned assets. Based on 
these estimates and depending on their location, the pre-positioned assets may arrive 
within acceptable time frames.  During Desert Storm the ships from Diego Garcia arrived 
in the Southwest Asian Theater within a week. The ships at Guam and Saipan took as 
long as two weeks to reach Southwest Asia, but they were less than a week away from 
most of the potential hot spots in the Pacific Rim. (Nabor, 1999) 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SCENARIOS 
In order to explore the implications of a wide range of assumptions regarding 
location of contingency, use of pre-positioning sites and general operational 
characteristics related to deployments, this thesis models two scenarios comparing TSVs 
and LMSRs with the objective of minimizing the time to deploy one SBCT in each 
scenario.  In the first scenario the deployment is made from a pre-positioned site; the 
second scenario models the deployment from CONUS under ideal port conditions.  
The scenarios used for modeling purposes support a fictional Kosovo campaign. 
This campaign involves the deployment of an SBCT to Skopje, Macedonia, for 
operations in Kosovo. The sealift piece of the Kosovo campaign establishes the Port of 
Embarkation (POE) as either Beaumont, Texas or Camp Darby, Italy.  The Port of 
Debarkation (POD) is Thessaloniki, Greece.  All equipment, material, and personnel 
arrive in Thessaloniki via sealift and then are moved to Skopje via land transportation.  
The area of interest in this thesis is the sealift portion from POE to POD.  The first 
scenario route is from the pre-positioned Point of Embarkation (POE) location of Camp 
Darby, Italy.  The steaming distance from Camp Darby to Thessaloniki is about 1,100 
nms (Vick, 2002).  The second scenario route is from the Beaumont, Texas, across the 
Atlantic Ocean, through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea, then to the 
Point of Debarkation (POD) Thessaloniki, Greece which is approximately 6,378 nms. 
Both Beaumont and Thessaloniki have well-developed ports capable of accommodating 
either a TSV or LMSR. (Vick, 2002)  The representative distances listed in Tables 3 and 
4 below are used as input into the ILP model. 
 
Destination POE POD Distance (nms)
Skopje, Camp Darby, Thessaloniki, 1,100




Table 3.   PREPO Sealift Scenario. 
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Destination POE POD Distance (nms)





Table 4.   CONUS Sealift Scenario. 
 
A slight twist to the second scenario is introduced which utilizes the CONUS 
Kosovo scenario but degrades the port characteristics to test the sensitivity of the model 
solution. 
 
B. MODEL DESCRIPTIONS  
This thesis develops two models to determine the Army’s sealift requirements for 
a 96-hour global response.  Two sets of analysis are conducted to determine if the assets 
available meet the 96-hour time requirement and to make recommendations on the fleet 
size by establishing the baseline requirements for TSVs and LMSRs.  First, an analysis of 
baseline requirements is conducted to determine what number of TSVs and LMSRs are 
needed to in order to move a SBCT varying distances within 96 hours for selected units.  
The second analytical effort is to determine the optimal number of TSVs and LMSRs 
needed for a given scenario to minimize time. 
These models are developed in order to gain perspective into the scope of the 
problem and are used to estimate the time and quantity necessary to complete the mission 
of delivering a SBCT across varying distances. More elaborate programs may exist, but 
Microsoft Excel is used because of its widespread availability and commonality. 
1. Snap Shot Model 
The first model is the Snap Shot model. The model inputs are based on data and 
parameters used by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) to determine intra-theater lift 
requirements from similar vessels.  The objective of this model is to estimate the time 
required to move the SBCT given a number of ships of each type (LMSR and TSV) in 
order to establish baseline requirements based on distance. For planning purposes, this  
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aids the decision maker in determining the minimum number of assets needed to be 
available and the time required. Range, speed, ship’s draft and cargo capacity, and 
unloading/loading times are inputs to the model as shown in Table 5. 
 
261,989 ft2
SHIP DATA One-Way Cruise Full Load Capacity Load/Unload
Assets Range (nms) Speed (kts) Draft (ft) ft2 Time (hrs)
LMSR 12,000 24 36 250,000 48
TSV 1,250 40 15 25,000 4
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)
 
Table 5.   Snap Shot Inputs. 
 
A number of assumptions are made in the modeling process for ease of 
computation such as unrestricted port availability and eliminating any refueling 
requirements to provide the rough estimates for each individual platform. In addition, the 
model indicates for each range category the percentage of the SBCT delivered. For 
planning purposes when using this model 50% of the SBCT is the minimum combat 
capability required to be combat effective, which is based on a strategic responsiveness 
study done by the RAND Corporation (Peltz, 2003). 
The snap shot model ascertains the performance of each sealift asset based on 
their individual characteristics.  The data compiled is based on ship type, speed, range, 
capacity and unload/loading times 
The model provides the decision maker with a snapshot of the number of trips it 
would take for an incremental amount of ships from one to twenty to deliver an SBCT 
based solely on their respective cargo capacity.  This is a straightforward calculation of 
the SBCT size (sq. ft) divided by the total capacity of the ships assigned (sq. ft).  The 
corresponding time is based on the prescribed quantity of ships transiting the upper range 
distance listed for each range category and adding the loading/unloading times for each.  
Subsequently, the amount of respective cargo capacity for each vessel correlates to a 





2. Sealift Optimization Model 
The second analytical effort focuses on the possible mix and match of TSVs and 
LMSRs rather than a mere baseline calculation of transportation assets based on distance.  
It is important to consider other factors while also including possible mixes of assets in 
the solution set to perform this analysis.  In addition to the snap shot model inputs the 
following are developed: cost, port penalty times for violating draft or capacity 
constraints, destination port’s distance, depth and capacity, and the number of each ship 
available.  The inputs listed in Table 6 are based on data and estimates obtained from 
CAA.  
SHIP DATA
One-Way Cruise Full Load Capacity Load/Unload Refueling
SHIP Cost ($M) Range (nms) Speed (kts) Draft (ft) ft2 Time (hrs) Time (hrs) Draft Capacity
LMSR $309 12,000 24 36 250,000 48 24 36 2
TSV $65 1,250 40 15 25,000 4 4 8 2
Distance Cargo Port Depth Port Capacity
PORT (nms) Required (ft) (ft) (k sq. ft) TSV LMSR





Table 6.   Sealift Optimization Inputs. 
 
A number of assumptions are made in the modeling process.  Many of these are 
made for ease of modeling purposes, or because the author felt that the added complexity 
did not warrant the impact that they would have in significantly affecting the output. The 
assumptions are: 
• There are an adequate number of ships available. 
• All ships meet activation times. 
• No attrition of sealift ships. 
• Ships operate at a constant speed in sea state 3. 
• Each ship makes only one trip. 
• Refueling occurs at the one-way range distance. 
• The ships are offloaded in series. 
An assumption that may have significant impact but is not modeled is the 
consideration of ship capacity in tonnage. The SBCT is compared based on square feet 
capacity of each vessel.  It is possible that the SBCT could meet the square feet 
requirements of a vessel, yet be too heavy to transport.   Studies by the Rand Corporation 
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and the U.S. Transportation Command have shown fluctuations in the weight of the 
SBCT from 12,840 to 14,663 short tons and the final weight seems uncertain (Vick, 
2002).  The weight constraint is not likely to affect the LMSR, however the estimates for 
the capacity of the TSV range from 754 short tons to an objective of 1,250 short tons 
(Burger, 2003). For modeling purposes, the ships can accommodate the SBCT weight 
based on size in square feet as indicated. 
   
C. SEALIFT INTEGER LINEAR FORMAT 
This formulation is formatted to facilitate reader understanding. Explanations 
follow the equations. 
 
1. Sealift Formulation 
 
INDICES: 
 i  : (2) ship type (LMSR, TSV) 




SPEEDi : Speed of ship type (i) in knots 
CAPi  : Cargo Capacity of ship (i) in sq. ft 
LOADUTi : Load/unload time in hours of ship type (i) 
REFUELi : Refueling time in hours of ship type (i) 
PORTPDi  : Port Penalty time for draft in hours for ship type (i) at POD 
PORTPCi : Port Penalty time for capacity in hours for ship  type (i) at POD 
CARGO : Required Cargo at POD in sq. ft 
DISTj  : Distance from port (j) to the port of debarkation in nautical miles 
FLEETi : Number of available ships of type(i) to transit from port (j)  
(Integer)   
DRAFTi : Draft in feet of ship type(i). 
PCAP  : Cargo capacity of POD 
PDEPTH : Depth in feet of POD 
TIMEij  : Amount of time in hours for ship type (i) to transit to POD from  
  port (j) 















Minimize  ij ij ijTIME X∑
 
S.T.    <=  FLEETj iX∑ j
i
i         for all i 
 
  =>  CARGO      for all j j ijX CAP∑
 
Xij  =  INTEGER      for all i,j   
 
Xij  => 0                    for all i,j   
 
 
2. Model Specifics 
The indices (i,j) are used to represent the ship types and destination ports.  The 
data parameters represent the individual ship characteristics such as speed (SPEEDi), 
capacity (CAPi), and associated times for refueling (REFUELi) and unloading/loading 
(LOADUTi).  The other data inputs listed above are additional sealift planning factors. 
They are part of the equation to calculate specific transit times. Essentially, the time 
associated with each ship’s transit time is the following: 
TIMEij = (DISTj / SPEEDi) +( LOADUTi* Xij) + REFUELi + PORTPDj  + PORTPCj 
This equation for time is where the remaining data inputs are entered into the 
model. First, a statement is embedded to check to see if the ship can reach the port based 
on each ship’s one-way range. If it cannot then the necessary refueling (REFUELi) times 
for each ship is added to the time of arrival.  For example, one TSV leaving Beaumont 
for Thessaloniki requires six refuelings.  Refueling would then equal twenty-four hours.       
The next step checks ship drafts against port depths (DRAFTi <= PDEPTH) to 
ensure that completion of the trip is possible, otherwise a port draft penalty time 
(PORTPDi) is for each ship to compensate for other avenues to load/unload cargo 
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(LOADUTi).  The same applies to port capacity. If the ship’s cargo capacity (CAPi) 
exceeds port capacity (PCAP), then a port capacity penalty time (PORTPCi) is added for 
each ship to account for stages of loading and unloading.  These port penalty times avoid 
infeasible solutions by allowing for a comparison of trip completion times where 
otherwise a vessel would have been excluded because of physical limitations.   
The number of ships assigned (Xij) is the decision variable that is calculated by 
the model subject to constraints: 
1.   <=  FLEETj iX∑ j
i
i
i         for all i 
2.  =>  CARGO      for all j j ijX CAP∑
3. Xij  =  INTEGER      for all i,j   
4.  Xij  => 0                    for all i,j   
The first constraint ensures that the total number or ships assigned (Xij) are less 
than or equal to the total number of ships available (FLEETi).  The second constraint 
ensures that the total amount of cargo delivered by the assigned ships ( ) meets 
the cargo requirements requested (CARGO), in this case the size of the SBCT.  The third 
constraint requires that the assigned number of ships required (X
j ijX CAP∑
ij) be integers. The final 
constraint restricts the model from assigning a negative number of ships. 
 
The objective function of this model (Minimize ij ij ijTIME X∑ ), 
 
minimizes time by changing the number of ships assigned (Xij), not to exceed those 
available (FLEETi) while ensuring that the cargo requirements (CARGO) are met.  
Having met these constraints, the model then computes the number of ships (integer only) 
required and the travel time to reach the destination port. 
  
D. DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES 
There are numerous sources of information on this topic such as existing texts on 
strategic mobility, professional articles, research papers and Department of Defense 
sponsored studies. Conflicting information or data was resolved through coordination 
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with Army and civilian analysts in conjunction with the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) 
and Military Sealift Command (MSC). Whenever possible, factual data is used to provide 
realism and relevance, yet some generic data is imposed in order to remain at an 
unclassified level. A synopsis of the data used in the models and its source is provided in 
Table 7 below. (Callahan, 1998) 
 
Data Rationale/Source 
Existing Ship data Averages of ship types and current designs. 
Representative Port Capacities Based on historic accounts and accumulated observations. 
Representative Load Times Averages based on ship type. 
Cargo Requirements Based on CAA data 
Port Drafts, distances, 
Refueling/loading/unloading 
times and penalties 
Author’s estimates based on accumulated observations and 
historic accounts and studies. 
Cost Information Author’s estimates based on various reports and input from the 
Military Sealift Command. 
 
Table 7.   Data Assumptions. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND APPLICATION 
A ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The general methodology used to analyze the data is to establish a baseline and 
vary parameters within the baseline first singularly and later in combination to test the 
sensitivity of the model solution.  This approach is used to attempt to gain insight into the 
various effects of certain variables on the model.  
 
1. Snap Shot Model Results 
From the quick look snapshot model it is evident that a 96-hour time requirement 
for SBCT team delivery is range dependent. In Tables 8 and 9, the unshaded portion of 
the “% SBCT” row represents those ranges that meet the minimum 50% delivery 
requirement of the SBCT. Although, complete SBCT delivery is the Army’s goal, this is 
significant because it represents the minimum level believed to be combat effective 
(Peltz, 2003). 
For example as shown in Table 8, one LMSR at a range up to 52 nms would 
deliver 95.42% of the SBCT in 50.17 hours.  Adding an additional LMSR would ensure 
100% SBCT delivery at a range of 144 nms in 102 hours. This baseline for the LMSRs 
indicates that two LMSRs are needed for SBCT deployment and that meeting the 96-hour 
time constraint is not guaranteed for ranges exceeding 52nms.  
The TSV baseline requirement to meet the minimum 50% requirement within 96 
hours requires ten TSVs at a range up to 1,104 nms as seen in Table 9.  For this number 
of TSVs it would take 67.6 hours to deliver 52.34% of the SBCT.  For planning, at least 
that number of ships must be available to deliver the SBCT within that timeframe. At 
greater ranges using TSVs it is quite evident that the distance would preclude a successful 






Distance (NM) 1 - 52 53 - 144 145 - 227 228 -344 345 - 453 454 - 648 649 - 1104 1105 - 3384
# ships 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 20
# Trips 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trip time (hrs) 50.17 102.00 153.46 206.33 258.88 363.00 526.00 1101.00
% SBCT 95.42% 190.85% 286.27% 381.70% 477.12% 667.97% 954.24% 1908.48%
1
 




Distance (NM) 1 - 52 53 - 144 145 - 227 228 -344 345 - 453 454 - 648 649 - 1104 1105 - 3384
# ships 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 20
# Trips 11 6 4 3 3 2 2 1
Trip time (hrs) 5.30 11.60 17.68 24.60 31.33 44.20 67.60 164.60
% SBCT 5.23% 10.47% 15.70% 20.94% 26.17% 36.64% 52.34% 104.68%  
Table 9.   TSV Snap Shot. 
 
The range-bracketed distances used for analysis are based on parametric analysis 
conducted by CAA in similar studies. The incremental number of ships listed in Tables 8 
and 9 is selected to show changes in the number of trips required for completion (Burger, 
2003). 
 
2. Sealift Optimization Model Results 
The Sealift Optimization model calculates the optimal number of ships to 
minimize the time to deliver the SBCT for each scenario. The model takes into account 
all previously mentioned sealift planning factors, specifically those listed in the tables 
below.  Table 10 summarizes the ship data used for calculation including cost and 
associated penalty times for delays in the PREPO Kosovo campaign. 
 
SHIP DATA
One-Way Cruise Full Load Capacity Load/Unload Refueling
SHIP Cost ($M) Range (nms) Speed (kts) Draft (ft) ft2 Time (hrs) Time (hrs) Draft Capacity
LMSR $309 12,000 24 36 250,000 48 24 36 2




Table 10.   Kosovo PREPO Ship Data. 
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 Table 11 summarizes the specific assumptions for the port characteristics and 
number of ships available used in the PREPO Kosovo campaign. 
 
Distance Cargo Port Depth Port Capacity
PORT (nms) Required (ft) (ft) (k sq. ft) TSV LMSR
A 1,100 261,989 40 300,000 20 31
Available Ships
 
Table 11.   Kosovo PREPO Port Data. 
 
Table 12 shows the optimized solution for the PREPO Kosovo campaign. For this 
scenario the route was from the pre-positioned site Camp Darby, Italy to Thessaloniki, 




Destination Port ft k sq. ft. SHIP Required Available Millions
Thessaloniki 40 300,000 LMSR 0 31 $0.00
TSV 11 20 $715.00
Destination Port  TIME (hrs)  TIME (hrs)
Thessaloniki 0.00 71.50 SHIP Delivered Required % SBCT
LMSR 0 261,989.00 0.00%
TSV 275,000 261,989.00 104.97%
Total Time (hrs) 71.50
TOTAL: 275,000 261,989.00 104.97%









Table 12.   Kosovo PREPO Range Optimization. 
 
The results show that by using eleven TSVs, it would take 71.50 hours to deliver 
the SBCT a distance of 1,100 nms from the pre-positioned location.  The cargo required 
(CARGO) is the stated SBCT size (261,989 sq. ft). The cargo requirement is met based 
on the model solution of 275,000 sq. ft, which equates to 104.97% SBCT delivery at a 
cost of $715 million. 
In the next scenario, the SBCT is deployed to Kosovo from CONUS embarking 
from Beaumont, Texas to Thessaloniki, Greece with optimal port conditions. The ship 
data remains the same as in Table 8, however the distances are different as shown below 
in Table 13. 
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Distance Cargo Port Depth Port Capacity
PORT (nms) Required (ft) (ft) (k sq. ft) TSV LMSR
A 6,378 261,989 40 300,000 20 31
Available Ships
 
Table 13.   Kosovo CONUS Port Data. 
 
Table 14 below shows the optimized solution for the CONUS Kosovo vignette. 
The model chooses two LMSRs, which illustrates the shift to larger capacity and 




Destination Port ft k sq. ft. SHIP Required Available Millions
Thessaloniki 40 300,000 LMSR 2 31 $618.00
TSV 0 20 $0.00
Destination Port  TIME TIME
Thessaloniki 361.75 0.00 SHIP Delivered Required % SBCT
LMSR 500,000 261,989.00 190.85%
TSV 0 261,989.00 0.00%
Total Time 361.75









Table 14.   Kosovo CONUS Range Optimization. 
 
The results show that by using two LMSRs, it would take 361.75 hours to deliver 
the SBCT a distance of 6,378 nms from CONUS.  The cargo required (CARGO) is the 
stated SBCT size (261,989 sq. ft). The cargo requirement is met based on the model 
solution of 500,000 sq. ft, which equates to 190.85% SBCT delivery at a cost of $618 
million. 
The last scenario utilizes the same CONUS Kosovo campaign, but with different 
port characteristics to measure the effect. Table 15 shows the reduction in port depth to 
accommodate only ships with a 20 ft or less draft and port capacity limited to 100,000 sq. 
feet. These changes in port characteristics are done to evaluate the effect of potential port 
penalty times being added to the ship arrival times. Port penalties are incurred as a result 
of draft or capacity constraints being exceeded.  Also, these changes in model input serve 
to reflect real situations that may be faced by our forces during a combat mission such as 
degraded or inaccessible ports.  
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Distance Cargo Port Depth Port Capacity
PORT (nms) Required (ft) (ft) (k sq. ft) TSV LMSR
A 6,378 261,989 20 100,000 20 31
Available Ships
 
Table 15.   Kosovo CONUS Degraded Port. 
 
Table 16 below shows that there is no change in the optimal solution for the 
CONUS Kosovo vignette if the port is degraded.  The results show that by continuing to 
utilize two LMSRs, it would take 437.75 hours to deliver the SBCT a distance of 6,378 
nms from CONUS.  The cargo required (CARGO) is the stated SBCT size (261,989 sq. 
ft). The cargo delivered based on the model solution is 500,000 sq. ft, which equates to 





Destination Port ft k sq. ft. SHIP Required Available Millions
Thessaloniki 20 100,000 LMSR 2 31 $618.00
TSV 0 20 $0.
Destination Port  TIME (hrs)  TIME (hrs)
Thessaloniki 437.75 0.00 SHIP Delivered Required % SBCT
LMSR 500,000 261,989.00 190.85%
TS
00
V 0 261,989.00 0.00%
Total Time (hrs) 437.75
TOTAL: 500,000 261,989.00 190.85%








Table 16.   Degraded Kosovo CONUS Optimization. 
 
B. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
1. Summary of Initial Results 
With the objective being to minimize time it is readily observed that for short 
PREPO distances the TSV is preferred.  For distances within the one-way range (1250 
nms) of the TSV it will always be preferred because of the speed advantage. As such, by 
increasing the number of TSVs to ensure cargo capacity is met (in this case eleven ships) 
the 96-hour time line is met as well. However, for distances greater than 1250 nms the 
necessity to include refueling times no longer permits completion within the prescribed 
96-hour time frame using TSVs.   
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For distances greater than the one-way range of a TSV, the 96-hour time goal is 
no longer feasible and the greater endurance and capacity of the LMSR becomes more 
prominent. In the event of port degradation, it is the LMSR arrival time that is affected by 
the poorer port condition as expected.  Because the penalties are time related they do not 
necessarily preclude a ship from completing its mission.   
In the CONUS Kosovo with port degradation vignette, the high endurance and 
capacity of the LMSR prevails over the TSV because the additional time delay for port 
penalties is less than the time it would take for refueling of eleven TSVs over this 
distance.  The time using the two LMSRs is 437.75 hours vice the 467.45 hours it would 
take eleven TSVs to complete the trip. 
The majorities of ports are more accommodating to the TSV because of its 
shallower draft and, depending on the real time scenario, increased or weighted values 
assigned to the port penalties may render the use of LMSRs less attractive or no longer 
feasible. In this case the time saved was 29.7 hours and depending on operational 
commitments the extra day delay may not be significant. 
Using response time as a metric, the TSV provides a clear advantage at PREPO 
ranges over the LMSR.  When the distance is extended, the additional cargo capacity of 
the LMSR compensates for the slower speed in the overall minimization of time required 
to deliver an SBCT.  Limiting or restricting the amount of ships available, may reduce 
time, but fails to deliver the required amount of cargo. 
The Sealift Optimization model shows that for PREPO ranges the TSV does 
provide faster response times with all under the 96-hour Army requirement.  This 
requires using 11 TSVs with a slightly greater cost than two LMSRs, yet better efficiency 
as measured by the percentage of SBCT delivered.  The most economical solution (using 
two LMSRs vice 11 SBCTs) would be cheaper yet slower and would have excess 





2. Lower Cargo Threshold 
Depending on the operational environment, complete SBCT deployment may not 
be necessary.  The minimum level required for combat effectiveness is 50% of the SBCT, 
therefore it is important that the Army assess the requirements at this level to reduce 
vulnerability (Peltz, 2003).   
The observed result is that if the cargo requirement is reduced to 50% of SBCT,  
the model solution still chooses the same platform for delivery, however the number of 
assets required is reduced and the subsequent completion time as well to account for less 
ships to load/unload and refuel. For example, at a range of 1,100 nms if the cargo 
requirement is reduced to 50% SBCT, the solution still utilizes only TSVs, but instead of 
eleven ships it only requires six ships to complete the mission and in less time.   
 
3. Cost Performance Analysis 
While the model is not designed to optimize a solution based on cost, it is 
important to provide the decision maker with a cost comparison because of the reality of 
fiscal constraints.  Cost estimates for ships tend to vary based on Army and Military 
Sealift Command data.  The TSV is estimated to cost between $65 and $85 million 
compared to the price tag of $309 to $349 million for an LMSR (Hickins, 2003).  These 
cost figures are strictly construction costs and do not take into consideration any other 
factors associated with life cycle costs.  The TSV cost could differ depending on 
upgrades for military command/communication or self-defense suites. The cost of two 
LMSRs is less than that of eleven TSVs required to deliver a complete SBCT however 
this economical solution does not use all asset space implying excess capacity.   
As described in the preliminary analysis, in Chapter I, there are three reasonable, 
and feasible, configurations to deploy the SBCT.  Option 1 utilizes TSVs only, Option 2 
utilizes only LMSRs and Option 3 utilizes a combination of both. For each option, I 
compare cost versus performance for 50% and 100% SBCT delivery.  As mentioned 
previously, these percentages are important because they represent the minimum and full 
requirement for SBCT combat effectiveness. The ranges are chosen to represent the 
distances in the PREPO and CONUS Kosovo campaigns.  Performance is defined as 
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1/Time in hours to make graphical analysis more obvious as higher values for 
performance variable show improvement.  The ideal situation would be to obtain the 
highest performance (shortest time) at the lowest cost. 
The first case deals with 50% SBCT delivery at a range of 1,100 nms and the 
solution for each option, based on cargo requirements and distance is listed in Table 17. 
 
Distance: 1,100 nms Assets Cost Time 
Option 1 6 TSVs $390 Million 51.5 hours 
Option 2 1 LMSR $309 Million 93.83 hours 
Option 3 1 TSV/ 1 LMSR $374 Million 125.33 hours 
 
Table 17.   Solutions for 50% SBCT at 1,100 nms. 
 
Figure 4 below shows the cost performance analysis versus time for 50% SBCT 
delivery at a range of 1,100 nms.  This output is treated as essentially a utility curve 
(Sage, 2000).  It allows a decision maker to choose the best alternative based on their 
assessment of the need to provide greater performance at a specified cost.  Here, there are 
only two legitimate choices, options 1 and 2.  Essentially, option 2 (1 LMSR @ $309 
Million) dominates option 3 (1 TSV/ 1 LMSR @ $374 Million), as option 2 has higher 
performance and costs less, so there is no reason to choose option 3.  However, from the 
graph it is clear that option 1 (6 TSVs @ $390 Million) results in nearly twice the 
performance capability of option 2, but at the cost of an additional nearly $100 million.  
Therefore, a decision between these two options would be based on whether providing 
twice the performance is worth the additional cost. 
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Figure 4.   50% SBCT Cost Performance Analysis. 
 
The second case deals with 100% SBCT delivery at a range of 6,378 nms and the 
solution for each option, based on cargo requirements and distance is listed in Table 18. 
 
Distance:   6,378 nms Assets Cost Time 
Option 1 11 TSVs $715 Million 467.45 hours 
Option 2 2 LMSR $618 Million 361.75 hours 
Option 3 1 TSV/ 1 LMSR $374 Million 501.20 hours 
 
Table 18.   Solution for 100% SBCT at 6,378 nms. 
 
Figure 5 below shows the cost performance analysis versus time for 100% SBCT 
delivery at a range of 6,378 nms.  Essentially, option 2 (2 LMSR @ $618 Million) 
dominates option 1 (11 TSVs @ $715 Million), as it has higher performance and costs 
less, so there is no reason to choose option 1.  However, from the graph it is clear that 
option 3 (1 TSV/ 1 LMSR @ $374 Million) results in the least overall costs, but also with 
the lowest overall performance.  The choice for a decision maker is therefore between 
options 2 and 3, based on the need to have nearly a 30% reduction in time performance, 
yet at an additional cost of over $240 million. 
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Figure 5.   100% SBCT Cost Performance Analysis. 
 
For short ranges, option 1 clearly provides the best performance but always at the 
highest costs.  The more the range increases the more option 2 improves in performance 
with a lesser increase in cost than option 1. Since all three options can complete the 
mission, if time is not a concern then option 3 over longer ranges may prevail because of 




V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Army has set very aggressive goals for force projection and strategic 
responsiveness through its efforts to transform into an interim force (SBCT) capable of 
deploying globally in 96-hours.  However, from the analysis conducted in this research it 
would appear that the 96-hour time requirement to deploy a SBCT using sealift assets 
would only be viable within short PREPO intra-theater ranges vice a global response. 
Essentially, the SBCT cannot meet the 96-hour global deployment time frame from 
CONUS, which highlights the advantage and need for pre-positioning units for rapid 
response. 
Specifically, this analysis finds that the best mix of assets depends on the scenario 
distance and port accessibility. Two scenarios are modeled based on a fictional Kosovo 
campaign.  The first scenario deploys the SBCT from the PREPO location of Camp 
Darby, Italy. The second scenario deploys the SBCT from the CONUS location of 
Beaumont, Texas. Next, a hybrid of this CONUS scenario is conducted by changing the 
port characteristics to test the sensitivity of the model solution.  
These results show that for PREPO ranges up to 1250 nautical miles the TSV is 
better suited for SBCT deployment with its greater speed and shallower draft regardless 
of port conditions. For greater ranges, the LMSR is the preferred platform because of its 
endurance and capacity. Introducing port degradation at increased ranges may change the 
optimal solution depending if the time delays associated with the LMSRs is greater than 
the time for the additional refueling required by the TSVs. 
Cost versus performance analysis shows that for short ranges better performance 
can be achieved at higher costs using TSVs. As the range increases, the use of LMSRs 
becomes the preferred option for performance at moderate cost.  If time is not important 
then the less expensive combination of mixing one of each asset becomes an attractive 
option at longer ranges.  
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Although minimizing time remains a concern, it is important to note that with 
advanced or strategic warning to deploy taken into consideration, the speed advantage of 
TSVs may not be as significant if the Army’s time constraints are relaxed.  However, the 
TSVs may still serve to decrease response time by enabling pre-positioned equipment to 
be brought closer to shore.  In addition, the TSVs are better equipped to be multi-tasked 
and have less impact on the mission in the event of loss in terms of tonnage and cargo. 
The Army’s transformation objective of a 96-hour global deployment time 
implies a rapid strategic sealift at speeds that are currently not possible from CONUS.  
With increased efficiency in loading/unloading and refueling times as well as other 
mobility enhancements it will be possible to further reduce SBCT deployment times 
within one to two weeks for global response.  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A more robust model would be needed to more accurately represent the detailed 
movement of the SBCT.  Information could be gained by tracking and accounting for 
each level of equipment broken down by weight and square feet based on a time-phased 
approach.  For realism, actual Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) could be 
used to ascertain where potential backlogs or choke points may occur.  This may aid in 
the determination of how the SBCT must doctrinally deploy.  Since the SBCT is too big 
to deploy all at once rapidly, a more detailed model would assist the decision maker in 
determining the required and optimal force flow to best use available assets.  In assessing 
the efficiency of operations, other measures of effectiveness may be proposed based on 
actual operational data such as the percentage of ships available, activation and vessel 
turnaround time as well as operating cost data. 
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APPENDIX A.  VARIANTS 
A. THE STRYKER VARIANTS  
• Stryker ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle 
• Stryker MGS Mobile Gun System 
• Stryker ATGM Anti Tank Guided Missile 
• Stryker CV Commander’s Vehicle 
• Stryker MC Mortar Carrier 
• Stryker RV Reconnaissance Vehicle 
• Stryker ESV Engineer Squad Vehicle 
• Stryker NBC RV NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle 
• Stryker MEV Medical Evacuation Vehicle 
• Stryker FSV Fire Support Vehicle 
 
B. THE TWO MAIN VARIANTS 
1. Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) 
• Carries nine troops (driver and a commander) 
• 40mm Grenade Launcher 
• .50 Caliber Machine Gun 
 
2. Mobile Gun System (MGS) 
• 105 mm Cannon 
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APPENDIX B.  STRYKER ILLUSTRATIONS 
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